SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM :R/RADAR & COM ANT JETT FMEA NO 05-6EI-2006 -1 REV: 02/24/88

assembly :FWD LCA 1 AND 3

P/N RI :MC477-0262-0002 P/N VENDOR:

QUANTITY :2 : TWO CRIT. FUNC: CRIT. HDW:

VEHICLE 102 103 104 EFFECTIVITY: X X

₽L PHASE(\$): 00 X DO LO Lŝ

REDUNDANCY SCREEN:

APPROVED

A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS

PREPARED BY: DES

APPROVED BY: C STRONG

DES 644

REL T KIMURA QE J COURSEN

- CT +thon 2-27-48 REL QE

BY (NASA): SSMZ REL 116 440

ITEM: .

CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER (HDC), TYPE II - FIRE II COMMAND

FUNCTION:

AFTER THE GUILLOTINE HAS BEEN FIRED WITH TARM" AND FIRE I STIMULI PRESENT, THIS HOC DELAYS (4 SECONDS) FIRING OF PYROTECHNIC INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PIC'S) FOR THE SEPARATION NUT FOR JETTISON OF THE KU-BAND ANTENNA. 81V76A16(1), 83V76A18(1)

FAILURE MODE:

LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO TURN "ON"

CAUSE(5):

PIECE-PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PROCESSING ANOMALY, THERMAL STRESS

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE:
- (A) LOSS OF FIRE II COMMAND TO ONE OF TWO SETS OF PIC'S FOR SEPARATION NUT FIRING.
- (B) LOSS OF REDUNDANCY
- (C,D) NO EFFECT UNTIL SECOND FAILURE LOSS OF FIRE II COMMAND FOR ANTENNA SEPARATION NUT REDUNDANT PIC. FAILURE TO JETTISON DEPLOYED ANTENNA WOULD PREVENT CLOSURE OF PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRECLUDING A SAFE VEHICLE RETURN. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

FIRST FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT SINCE THE HYBRID DRIVER IS NOT MONITORED OR USED UNTIL JETTISON OF THE KU-BAND ANTENNA IS REQUIRED.

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DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

- (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE:
- (A-D) DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE REFER TO APPENDIX B, ITEM NO. 1 - HYBRID DRIVER
- (B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
 "KU-BAND ANTENNA JETTISON SYSTEM VERIFICATION" VERIFIES INTEGRITY OF
 KU-BAND ANTENNA JETTISON ARM AND FIRE CIRCUITS. TESTS ARE PERFORMED
 PRIOR TO EACH FLIGHT WITH ALL PYROS SAFED WITH WASA STANDARD INITIATOR
 (NSI) NO-GO SIMULATORS INSTALLED.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE NONE